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a b s t r a c t 
The link between ineffective forest monitoring and forest degradation is well known. Under 
REDD+, monitoring stands to become more important as a means of maintaining incentive. 
Little attention however has been paid to the possible adverse consequences of forest 
monitoring. Our research develops a spatially explicit, agent-based model (ABM) of timber 
extraction in a Congo Basin forest concession to investigate the potential conservation 
impact of more effective monitoring. We modeled the building of access roads, and logging 
of legal timber and illegal timber, where illegal timber may be interpreted broadly to include 
prohibited species, smaller trees, or trees in areas where cutting is not permitted. We 
investigated road building under (1) random spot monitoring of logging sites and (2) 
monitoring of logged trunks at checkpoints. Our findings indicate that although more 
effective monitoring can reduce illegal harvesting, it can also lead to construction of denser 
road networks and higher levels of forest fragmentation, with an implied loss of biodiversi-
ty. These insights are particularly relevant in the context of REDD+, as they suggest that 
some monitoring strategies may lead to more forest fragmentation, even as they help reduce 
emissions.  
      
        
        
      
         
       
     
        
       
        
        
        
1. Introduction
Where conservation and environmental outcomes are con-
cerned, monitoring is essential. A consistent body of research 
shows that poor monitoring and enforcement lead to negative 
conservation consequences such as habitat degradation and 
loss of biodiversity (e.g., Barrett et al., 2001), and effective 
monitoring helps overcome problems of illegal harvesting and 
resulting adverse environmental outcomes (Chhatre and 
Agrawal, 2008; Gibson et al., 2005). Relatively few scholars 
see more effective monitoring as producing negative con-
sequences; those who do mostly cite greater costs associated 
with more comprehensive or careful monitoring that may not 
yield commensurate benefits in terms of reduced illegal or   
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undesirable activities. Under the proposed activities of 
regimes such as REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforesta-
tion and Forest Degradation) (Agrawal et al., 2011; Phelps et al., 
2010; Stickler et al., 2009), monitoring and enforcement will be 
critical in establishing incentives for landholders and reducing 
risks for investors. Understanding the link between forest 
monitoring and land cover outcomes is thus of importance. 
Our research adds a new dimension to the existing work on 
resource governance by incorporating a spatial component to 
the analysis of monitoring. Using an agent-based model (ABM), 
we investigated how more effective monitoring may influence 
conservation outcomes in logging concessions in tropical 
forests. Our results suggest that incorporating the spatial 
features of monitoring and resources is important to better 
understand the relationship between improved monitoring and 
        
        
        
       
  
        
       
         
          
      
         
         
         
         
          
         
       
        
 
          
         
        
        
          
        
         
          
         
       
        
       
        
       
         
         
        
  
 
        
         
        
       
        
        
         
        
         
       
       
         
         
           
           
         
         
     
         
its impacts on conservation. In particular, our analysis suggests 
that depending on the spatial distribution of resources being 
protected, more effective monitoring might undercut one of the 
key goals of improved governance of logging concessions: 
conservation of biodiversity. 
Results from our ABM of monitoring indicate that although 
more effective monitoring can reduce illegal forest harvesting, 
it can simultaneously lead to higher levels of forest fragmen-
tation, with an implied loss of biodiversity. The link is that 
effective monitoring and enforcement causes logging compa-
nies to harvest only legal timber, thereby driving them to 
harvest less intensively in any given location and instead build 
a more extensive road network that allows them to harvest 
over a wider area. Recent accelerated growth of road networks 
in the Congo Basin has been documented (Laporte et al., 2007); 
the impacts of these road networks on forest structure and 
access can adversely affect biodiversity even as monitoring 
reduces illegal harvesting, net levels of timber extraction, and 
terrestrial emissions. 
In our study, we modeled the building of access roads, and 
logging in forest concessions of two classes of tree: legal 
timber and illegal timber, where the model allows illegal 
timber to be interpreted broadly to include prohibited species, 
smaller trees, or trees in areas where cutting is not permitted. 
We investigated road building under two types of monitoring 
and enforcement – (1) random spot monitoring of logging sites 
and (2) monitoring of logged trunks at checkpoints – in order 
to make a link between levels of monitoring effectiveness and 
outcomes for both the forest and concession-holder. Our 
results show that under both approaches, a greater expected 
penalty leads concession holders to refrain from cutting 
illegal timber and instead to build more extensive access 
roads to cut legal timber. Higher forest fragmentation 
(measured as lower average distances of forest grid cells to 
roads for a given total harvest) is consistently observed across 
forests with varying densities of legal timber when effective 
monitoring is present. 
2. Background 
The Congo Basin holds the world’s second largest contiguous 
tropical rainforest, and the largest in Africa. Forestry in the 
Congo Basin is similar to arrangements in tropical rainforests 
elsewhere, with most land being cut under large-scale 
(>100,000 ha) concessions (Mertens et al., 2001), along with 
other arrangements for felling of trees at smaller scales 
(2500 ha in the Cameroon case). Of the five ITTO-member 
countries in the Congo Basin, industrial concession forestry is 
most active in Gabon, Cameroon, and Republic of Congo (ROC), 
with dwindling forest resources in the Central African 
Republic (CAR) and as-yet undeveloped potential in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Pérez et al., 2005). Congo 
Basin forestry is highly selective with the focus of timber 
operators being on only a few species, and only a few trees 
felled per hectare (Pérez et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2006). This 
means that the direct impact of forestry is more degradation 
than deforestation (Zhang et al., 2006). The handful of species 
that dominate production include Okoumé (Aucoumea klai-
neana) in Gabon and the coast of ROC; Sapelli (Entandrophragma         
       
       
        
  
       
          
         
        
        
         
       
        
        
        
         
       
        
        
          
         
       
        
       
      
       
        
       
        
        
       
         
  
        
        
       
      
         
         
          
          
        
        
      
        
          
        
       
         
      
          
       
        
        
        
     
          
       
       
        
cylindricum) and Sipo (Entandrophragma utile) in the interior of 
ROC, CAR, and parts of Cameroon; Ayous (Triphlochiton 
scleroxylon), Iroko (Milicia excelsa and Chlorophora excelsa), and 
Azobé (Lophira alata) in DRC and much of Cameroon (Pérez 
et al., 2005). 
Although the term ‘concession’ has a broad interpretation 
in the literature (Hardin, 2011), here we follow Karsenty et al. 
(2008) and use it to refer specifically to industrial forestry 
operations. In the Congo Basin context, ‘industrial’ has also 
come to mean ‘foreign’; while many national logging compa-
nies exist in Cameroon for example (with the number rising), 
foreign industrial logging operations still account for five 
times more felled trees by volume than these Cameroonian 
enterprises (Brown and Ekoko, 2001). In some ways, foreign 
and national logging companies occupy different niches in the 
industry. For example, foreign groups are more able to cope 
with regulations and costs of larger concessions, while 
national groups are better positioned to exploit local markets 
and work with local governments (Pérez et al., 2006). 
Concessions in the basin are typically on the order of the 
length of a single harvest rotation (25–30 years), with cutting 
authorized annually and the contract subject to cancellation, 
helping in theory to reduce ‘hit-and-run’ plundering of forest 
resources (Karsenty et al., 2008). However, this requires 
commitment from governments to monitor and enforce 
regulations (Karsenty et al., 2008), and forest administrations 
in the region typically lack technical, human, and financial 
resources (Pérez et al., 2005). Concession arrangements favor 
ex-post monitoring (Karsenty et al., 2008), which can increase 
the risk and transaction costs associated with felling in 
inappropriate areas, for example. This weeds out less-efficient 
operators, who in many cases are more destructive in their 
practices (Gbetnkom, 2005). 
In this study we spatially examine the impacts that 
effective monitoring may have on illegal cutting in industrial 
forest concessions using an agent-based model of road 
building, tree cutting, and forest monitoring. Agent-based 
modeling (ABM) has been applied to a range of natural 
resource management issues in recent years (see BenDor et al., 
2009; Berger, 2001; Berger et al., 2005; Elliston and Cao, 2006; 
Schlueter et al., 2009; Summers et al., 2004). In an ABM 
approach to modeling a system (such as agricultural, fishing, 
or forestry), individual resource users are modeled as ‘agents’. 
These agents observe conditions in their environment 
(resources, climate, market prices, the actions of other agents, 
or even the consequences of their own past actions) and make 
decisions based on these observations, following a set of 
behavioral rules built into the model. Landscape-scale out-
comes emerge as the consequence of the set of modeled 
individual decisions (e.g., deforestation patterns emerging out 
of individual choices about land use on farms; or fertility rates 
emerging out of individual decisions between work, school, 
and having children). The key contribution of the ABM 
framework to natural resource management is the ability to 
build links across scales between the decision processes of 
resource stakeholders and system-level environmental out-
comes, both (1) to test how well candidate models of decision-
making can explain observed environmental outcomes and (2) 
to understand what the possible consequences of observed 
decision-making processes may be for the future of natural 
        
       
        
      
    
Fig. 1 – Simple linear approximation for the regulation 
process for natural resources like forests. The current 
study deals exclusively with the second part of the 
process, the relationship between the perceived policy 
signal and the environmental outcome.           
   
         
         
         
       
        
         
        
          
         
        
       
         
      
        
         
       
        
        
        
 
  
         
           
       
        
      
          
        
            
       
        
 
          
          
           
          
       
         
       
        
       
   
          
          
            
           
          
          
         
        
          
       
           
        
        
resource systems. It is this latter application of ABM that we 
develop in this paper. 
It is important to emphasize that the ABM framework and 
approach in our analysis has more an exploratory than a 
predictive role, because it is generally quite difficult to make 
precise predictions in the types of coupled natural-human 
systems that are typically the focus of ABM approaches 
(Bankes, 2002). Results from single simulation runs in an ABM 
framework can be strongly path dependent and not predictive 
of the most likely outcome in the real system; however, the 
results observed across a large number of model runs provide 
a better representation of the ‘possibility space’ (range of 
possible outcomes) of environmental outcomes for the system 
(Brown et al., 2005). Analysis of this possibility space can 
provide valuable qualitative insights, rather than precise 
predictions, into system behavior and response. In this study 
we use this analytical approach to gain insight into the 
consequences for forests of effective monitoring of forestry 
operations, and to highlight key areas for empirical research 
on concession forestry worldwide that will help validate our 
understanding of the impacts of the monitoring and enforce-
ment process. 
3. Model summary 
The model is intended to investigate the economic impacts on 
holders of a timber concession (the rights to cut timber in a 
specified area during a specified period), and environmental 
impacts on the land managed within the concession, of 
increased effort into monitoring and sanctioning operations. 
The model is informed by conditions in the logging industry in 
Cameroon, and includes three main components: (1) a forest 
patch, (2) a logging agent with rights to cut trees in the patch 
(concession) and (3) a monitoring agent, representing govern-
ment or independent efforts to observe cutting infractions and 
levy fines. 
The forest patch consists of discrete cells. Each grid cell in 
the forest patch has three state variables: a volume of legal 
timber (LT), a volume of illegal timber (IT), and a distance to 
nearest road, if one exists. IT can be broadly interpreted to 
include trees of protected species, of insufficient diameter, 
and trees in areas where cutting is not permitted. Timber 
distribution is generated by randomly placed ‘hot-spots’ of 
timber densities drawn from a power distribution, which are 
then kernel-smoothed to re-create the occurrence of clusters 
of commercially valuable species. 
In the model, the holder of the logging concession and the 
monitor act on a forest patch representing the area allocated for 
cutting in a single year, assumed to be 1600 ha (Fig. A.1); there 
are k cutting days in each year. The holder of the logging 
concession has a defined capacity Vcap that can be cut from the 
patch, and this capacity is spread evenly across k cutting days 
into Vcap,k; between cutting days the holder of the logging 
concession builds the necessary roads to access timber of 
interest. The value Vcap is defined in the current study by the 
legal constraint imposed in the forest management plan 
(Appendix B), though it is important to note that it can also 
be interpreted in the model framework as a technological 
(capital) or labor constraint. The concession holder has initial            
           
          
       
         
         
       
          
         
         
           
         
        
           
       
         
      
        
    
         
       
          
           
        
        
       
           
         
           
          
       
        
        
        
       
         
          
         
         
      
 
         
         
       
     
         
          
        
      
         
information of the timber density in a subsample of grid cells in 
the forest patch (analogous to a prior survey) but also sees all 
grid cells within a distance of the road as cutting progresses. 
The road-building strategy in this model follows FAO 
(1995), where the concession holder builds roads to access the 
densest sites of legal timber. When illegal timber is found 
within cutting distance from these roads, the concession 
holder makes a decision as to whether it will be more 
profitable to fill some capacity with this available illegal timber 
(rather than perhaps having to build more roads to meet 
capacity with timber that can be cut legally). This rule can be 
thought of as a constraint placed upon the more optimal 
strategy of building roads specifically to access illegal timber. 
As will be shown in the following sections, to the extent that 
the unconstrained, optimal strategy pervades in practice, we 
would expect the results shown in the current study (which 
compares the less-constrained to the more-constrained cases 
of ineffectively and effectively monitored forest patches) to be 
even stronger and more significant. 
On each cutting day the monitor has the opportunity to 
observe cutting and administer fines. This monitoring occurs 
in one of two ways: (1) a random spot monitoring approach, 
analogous to the idea of the monitor visiting a set of randomly 
selected locations within the site and checking tree stumps, 
and (2) a checkpoint monitoring approach, analogous to a 
monitor waiting at a roadside checkpoint and inspecting 
timber loads leaving the site at the end of each cutting day. 
Note that our model does not represent the processes that 
mediate a policy signal sent out by a governing body to enforce 
a regulation (Fig. 1, first arrow). Rather, the model focuses on 
the relationship between the mediated, perceived signal and 
the particular environmental goal of interest (Fig. 1, second 
arrow). Thus, the sanction and effort parameters can be 
thought of as mediated policy signals perceived by the 
concessionaire in which bribery and corruption are implicit. 
The role of governance in shaping the mediated policy signal 
(Fig. 1, first arrow) is an additional critical area for tropical 
forests research (e.g., Pedlowski et al., 2005; Soares-Filho et al., 
2006), to which our model is complementary in completing the 
link between forest governance initiatives and measurable 
forest-cover outcomes. 
The use of mediated policy signals allows analysis in a 
relatively simple model of the benefits that may accrue, and 
adverse consequences that may arise, through a more 
effectively implemented regulation. However, because we 
do not know the relationship between real efforts invested and 
mediated signal perceived (Fig. 1, first arrow), we are unable to 
assess the real costs of achieving forest outcomes through 
either monitoring approach, nor make economic comparisons 
between them. We note this set of relationships as important 
                          
                
   
Fig. 2 – Fraction of illegal timber still standing at the end of a cutting cycle of 1 year in a forest patch, as a function of 
increasing sanction severity (into the page) and monitoring effort (from left to right), under spot-monitoring (left) and 
checkpoint monitoring (right) regimes.         
      
       
        
          
         
          
         
         
        
  
        
       
          
    
  
          
        
           
     
        
areas for future research, and restrict ourselves in the 
following analysis to, again, investigating the relationships 
between net perceived policy signals and forest outcomes. 
An additional but important simplification in this model is 
that all roads are treated equivalently – the model does not 
distinguish between more vs. less permanent roads in terms of 
their ability to provide access or their capacity to degrade and 
fragment. A valuable extension of the current model and its 
findings will be to distinguish motivations for building roads of 
varying degrees of permanence and link these to higher-
fidelity model outcomes. 
A full description of the model following the ODD 
(Overview, Design concepts, and Details) protocol of Grimm 
et al. (2006, 2010) is included as Appendix B. Model parameters 
are summarized in Appendix B. 
4. Model experiments 
In the experiments described here, we focus on the effects of 
two key parameters of both monitoring approaches: (1) the 
severity of the sanction and (2) the level of effort invested in 
monitoring and enforcement. For both monitoring 
approaches, the severity of sanctions is represented by the           
    
 
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
–Table 1 Effort and fine levels represented by ordinal ‘monito
Monitoring effectiveness Random spot monitoring
Harvest Effort (probability
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fine levied per cubic meter of illegal timber detected. For spot 
monitoring, the level of effort is simply the likelihood in a 
given timestep of a given grid cell being randomly checked. For 
the checkpoint monitoring, the level of effort is represented by 
the maximum probability (i.e., when the truck is full of IT) of 
being stopped and caught at the checkpoint. 
We also vary the ratio of legal timber to illegal timber, LT:IT, 
in the forest while maintaining constant average biomass 
density across experiments. This allows us to examine 
concessionaire decision making over the shift from a forest 
in which most timber present may be legally cut, to a forest in 
which most timber is protected and there is little available for 
cutting. 
Finally, we vary the extent of the initial survey performed 
by the concessionaire, to explore the effect of information on 
concessionaire decisions in cutting and road building. These 
results are summarized in Appendix B, as our main effects are 
largely unaffected by changes in initial information. 
Although in practice many factors may affect the substi-
tutability of stronger sanctions for effort in monitoring, in the 
current simple model these two dimensions are clear 
substitutes, as seen by the symmetry in Fig. 2; these panels 
depict the changes in standing forest biomass that occur in the 




   









ring effectiveness’ dimension in experiments. 
Checkpoint monitoring 
of a given Harvest Effort (probability of catching 









        
          
        
         
regime as sanctions and monitoring effort are increased. We 
observed the same symmetry in results for a wide range of 
various parameter values (not reported here). Making use of 
this, we collapse the two dimensions of sanction severity and                 
            
         
          
               
            
         
           
Fig. 3 – Fraction of LT left standing in a patch after one year, as a
of the page) and increasing initial ratio of LT:IT (from left to rig
second year of the modeling run, after the concession-holder ha
monitoring is shown on the left; the response to checkpoint m
Fig. 4 – Fraction of IT left standing in a patch after one year, as a
the page) and increasing initial ratio of LT:IT (from right to left).
year of the modeling run, after the concessionaire has estimated
is shown on the left; the response to checkpoint monitoring is        
        
        
        
monitoring effort into a single ordinal dimension of ‘monitor-
ing effectiveness’ to simplify the presentation of our analysis. 
The scaling of sanction severity with effort as monitoring 
effectiveness increases in each of the spot and checkpoint       
          
          
     
       
          
          
   
function of increasing monitoring effectiveness (coming out 
ht). Results are shown for the forest patch logged in the 
s estimated the risks of being caught. The response to spot 
onitoring is shown on the right. 
function of increasing monitoring effectiveness (going into 
Results are shown for the forest patch logged in the second 
the risks of being caught. The response to spot monitoring 
shown on the right. 
         
           
         
          
        
       
       
          
        
         
        
        
        
           
          
           
       
      
         
        
        
        
        
     
           
          
         
        
  
monitoring cases is summarized in Table 1, and can be 
thought of as a cut along the diagonal from the origin running 
between the effort dimensions (upper left to lower right in 
each panel of Fig. 2). This approach is also consistent with 
most of the economic literature on monitoring, starting with 
Becker (1968), which emphasizes the expected value of 
penalties. We have selected monitoring and sanction param-
eters such that the major shift away from cutting illegal timber 
occurs over a monitoring effectiveness range of 1–8, with 
much of the transition in both approaches occurring at a 
monitoring effectiveness of 5 or 6. Beyond this qualitative 
comparison, we make no claim that a given monitoring 
effectiveness value means the same thing for both monitoring 
approaches. 
In all figures in this report, each point is generated as the 
mean of 32 replicate model runs. Results shown are for the 
forest patch logged in the second year of the model run, after 
the concession-holder has had time to estimate costs 
associated with monitoring. Variance among replicates in 
the amount of IT preserved is greatest during the transition 
from a low-effectiveness to a high-effectiveness regime for the 
spot monitoring approach, and in the ‘Sometimes cut’ regime 
for the checkpoint monitoring approach (Fig. 2, Appendix B). 
Variance in the extent of road building increases with 
monitoring effectiveness under both monitoring approaches 
(Appendix B). Figs. 2–4 and 6 show statistics based on the forest 
cells in the grid and are comparatively smooth; Fig. 5 shows 
statistics based on the relatively smaller number of road nodes 
within the grid and is comparatively rough, while still 
exhibiting clear trends.                 
         
            
          
Fig. 5 – Average distance (in cells) of a given cell to a road in a p
effectiveness (coming out of the page) and increasing initial ratio
patch logged in the second year of the modeling run, after the co
response to spot monitoring is shown on the left; the response    
        
   
      
            
       
        
          
         
        
           
           
             
         
      
        
      
         
      
 
       
      
  
       
           
5. Model results and discussion 
5.1. Outcomes – standing legal and illegal timber, roads 
built and profits earned 
Increased monitoring effectiveness leads to more illegal 
timber standing at the end of the k cutting days, and a greater 
cutting of legal timber for both monitoring approaches, 
lending important face validity to the functioning of the 
model (Figs. 3 and 4). Note that the surfaces are rotated 
differently for each variable to improve the views of the 
surfaces. In Fig. 3, monitoring effectiveness is shown as 
increasing coming out of the page; in Fig. 4, it increases going 
into the page. The ratio of LT:IT is displayed as increasing from 
left to right in Fig. 5, and from right to left in Fig. 4. 
For the purposes of analysis we discuss three regimes of 
concessionaire response: the ‘Always cut IT’ (monitoring 
effectiveness of 2–5 under spot monitoring, and 2–4 under 
checkpoint monitoring), ‘Never cut IT’ (monitoring effective-
ness of 6–8 under spot monitoring), and ‘Sometimes cut IT’ 
(monitoring effectiveness of 5–8 under checkpoint monitor-
ing) regimes. 
5.2. The low regulation, ‘Always cut IT’ regime 
(monitoring effectiveness 2–5 under spot monitoring, 2–4 
under checkpoint monitoring) 
When monitoring effectiveness is low, it makes economic 
sense for the concessionaire to cut both LT and IT in all          
            
        
        
atch after one year, as a function of increasing monitoring 
of LT:IT (from right to left). Results are shown for the forest 
ncessionaire has estimated the risks of being caught. The 
to checkpoint monitoring is shown on the right. 
            
           
        
            
        
          
        
               
        
           
             
            
          
         
            
         
       
         
        
            
          
        
            
        
         
            
 
         
  
        
        
instances – at least 80% of both LT and IT are cut when 
monitoring effectiveness is less than 5 (Figs. 3 and 4). Notably in 
this regime, for both spot and checkpoint monitoring cases, 
both LT and IT decrease as the ratio of LT:IT in the forest 
decreases. This also corresponds with an increase in the 
amount of roads that are being built, increasing the number of 
branching points and decreasing the average distance from any 
given cell in thepatch to a road (Figs.5 and 6). The reason for this 
is that between cutting days, concessionaires build roads until 
they can potentially meet capacity by LT alone, even if the roads 
builtpass through hotspotsof LT and IT; it is only in the moment 
of cutting that they make the decision to cut IT instead of LT. 
Thus, as the overall proportion of LT in the forest patch 
decreases, roads must become longer and more branched to be 
able to meet capacity only by cutting LT. In building the roads in 
this way, the concessionaire incidentally chooses to cut more IT 
along the way when monitoring level is low. 
This pattern in the roads is specific to the earlier-stated 
assumption that roads built by the concession holders will 
reflect only plans to cut LT, and is a strong function of initial 
information when the ratio LT:IT is high. That is, the less 
information concession holders have when they plan where to 
build roads, the less they are able to target LT hotspots and the 
less difference the actual ratio of LT:IT makes. Furthermore, 
the less information they have, the less efficiently they are 
likely to build roads (see cases for LT:IT of 1 and 4 in 
Appendix B). 
5.3. Effective spot monitoring – the ‘Never cut IT’ regime 
(monitoring effectiveness 6–8) 
When monitoring effectiveness is sufficiently high in the spot 
monitoring case, the concessionaire cuts no IT (except when              
           
          
          
Fig. 6 – Number of road branch points (nodes) in a patch after on
(going into the page) and increasing initial ratio of LT:IT (from ri
the second year of the modeling run, after the concessionaire ha
monitoring is shown on the left; the response to checkpoint m          
         
          
              
          
         
            
         
            
            
           
         
       
      
         
            
            
        
         
            
        
       
       
    
      
         
         
         
         
      
building roads), in order to avoid paying fines. In the spot 
monitoring case, there is a clear tipping point (around a 
monitoring effectiveness of 5 or 6) above which a large fraction 
of IT remains standing (Fig. 4). In this regime, IT is cut only as a 
side effect of roads building. Above this tipping point, effort is 
shifted into cutting LT, and more roads (with more branches) 
are built in order to reach the desired volume of LT. Within the 
‘Never cut’ regime, similar responses to changes in the LT:IT 
ratio are observed as in the ‘Always cut’ regime – the less LT 
there is, the more roads get built and the more timber gets cut. 
The notable exception to this is that the fraction of IT standing 
no longer changes as LT:IT decreases. In the ‘Never cut’ 
regime, the concessionaire will avoid cutting IT whenever 
possible. 
The threshold, tipping-point behavior occurs because (i) 
the concessionaire is cutting IT only when roads are already 
built, (ii) total cutting costs in the model are a linear function of 
volume, and (iii) all cells in the grid have an equal likelihood of 
being monitored. Thus, depending on the level of monitoring 
effectiveness, it either always makes economic sense to cut IT 
when it is close by, or never makes sense. Once the penalty is 
high enough, concessionaires shift their practices and do not 
cut IT at all (except to build roads). 
5.4. Effective checkpoint monitoring – the ‘Sometimes cut 
IT’ regime (monitoring effectiveness 5–8) 
Under checkpoint monitoring, as effectiveness increases we 
observe similar increases in the fraction of IT standing, but 
there is no ‘Never cut’ regime within the parameter range 
explored in this study. Instead, we observe a broader ‘Some-
times cut’ regime, across which the fraction of IT standing 
increases as LT:IT decreases and monitoring effectiveness         
           
          
     
e year, as a function of increasing monitoring effectiveness 
ght to left). Results are shown for the forest patch logged in 
s estimated the risks of being caught. The response to spot 
onitoring is shown on the right. 
                    
                      
                   
             
Fig. 7 – Net value (profits) derived during one year, as a function of increasing monitoring effectiveness (coming out of the 
page) and increasing initial ratio of LT:IT (from left to right). Results are shown for the forest patch logged in the second year 
of the modeling run, after the concessionaire has estimated the risks of being caught. The response to spot monitoring is 
shown on the left; the response to checkpoint monitoring is shown on the right.          
        
         
         
           
          
           
          
           
           
         
         
        
        
       
      
         
          
        
          
        
         
           
           
             
            
          
            
            
         
         
increases (Fig. 4). Similarly, the density of roads increases with 
an increase in monitoring effectiveness (Figs. 5 and 6). 
The reason for this more gradual transition is that the 
probability of getting caught depends on how much IT is 
loaded in the truck. Each additional unit of IT in the truck 
changes the probability of being caught in the same way, but 
with more IT in the truck, the penalty is greater. Thus, there 
comes a point at which the concessionaire is not willing to 
take any further risk of being caught (and paying fines on the 
stock of IT in the truck), but this point moves depending on 
how effective the monitoring regime is. We observe a more 
continuous shift toward LT and away from IT as monitoring 
effectiveness increases, in contrast to the sharp tipping point 
in the spot monitoring case (compare spot monitoring and 
checkpoint monitoring at monitoring effectiveness values of 5 
and 6 in Figs. 3 and 4). 
Across this continuous shift we are able to observe a 
different response to a change in the ratio LT:IT than observed 
in the spot monitoring case. When checkpoint monitoring is 
effective, the fraction of IT left standing increases as the ratio 
LT:IT decreases (visible most clearly in the transition region 
above a monitoring effectiveness of 4, Fig. 4). The simple 
explanation is that when there is less IT overall (when LT:IT is 
high), there is less IT to tempt the concessionaire and it will 
make up less of what is in the truck when it is cut. Further, 
each unit of IT cut represents a greater fraction of the total IT 
in the forest. As a result, the concessionaire gets caught less 
and leaves less of the IT remaining in the forest when LT is 
plentiful. As the ratio of LT:IT drops, there is more IT to cut, 
meaning that even as the concessionaire cuts more (and gets 
caught more) there remains more IT left on the ground.   
        
      
         
         
       
          
          
      
         
         
      
            
         
       
    
         
        
          
          
           
         
        
       
        
         
      
5.5. Concessionaire profitability 
The impact of monitoring and forest structure on the 
concessionaire’s profits is easily understood. Profits rise 
slightly in the ‘Always cut’ regimes as LT:IT decreases and 
more timber is cut, but drop off significantly as monitoring 
effectiveness increases into the ‘Never cut’ and ‘Sometimes 
cut’ regimes; these latter drops are greater when the ratio of 
LT:IT is lower (Fig. 7). Profits drop significantly more for the 
concessionaire under checkpoint monitoring. This reflects the 
lower precision in the model with which the concessionaire (at 
the point of cutting) estimates the expected cost of illegal 
harvesting under checkpoint monitoring (proportional to the 
final load of IT at the end of the cutting day), compared with 
that under spot monitoring (proportional only to the value of 
IT to be cut at the current site). 
6. Key findings and implications 
The major result from this study is that more effective 
monitoring leads to greater amounts of road building and 
greater branching of the roads. We illustrate this above in the 
case of monitoring to prevent a specific type of illegal cutting 
(the cutting of trees that are too small or are a protected 
species) but the argument can be extended to other problem-
atic practices, such as the cutting outside of allotted 
boundaries. In our analysis, the excessive cost associated 
with cutting illegal timber (IT) forced the concessionaire to 
build roads deeper into the allotted space to find sufficient 
legal timber (LT), increasing forest fragmentation. The 
         
          
          
      
        
          
          
          
          
        
        
        
         
         
       
         
       
        
          
        
       
         
          
          
          
 
          
        
       
         
         
         
       
        
         
          
         
          
         
          
           
            
        
        
       
          
          
        
      
         
       
       
        
             
        
          
        
           
          
        
restricted-area boundary problem – such as Arima et al. (2008) 
have observed in the Amazon case – could be represented in 
our model as a space occupied entirely by IT, forcing more 
extensive road-building into surrounding regions to meet 
capacity and causing similar increases in fragmentation. It is 
certainly true that in any context, cutting IT will occur when 
the net benefits of doing so compare favorably with those of 
moving to a new area to cut LT. However, these results 
highlight that as the costs of cutting IT increase, the net 
benefits of moving to pristine areas become more favorable, 
leading to higher fragmentation in the defined time periods 
upon which concession agreements are based. It is worth 
noting that the fragmentation effect emerges from the need to 
access more timber to meet capacity, rather than from any 
specific aspect of the road-building algorithm. Thus, regard-
less of the approach to building roads to provide access 
(whether a gridded ‘fishbone’ or an optimized, distance-
minimizing solution) we would expect some degree of the 
same effect. As a final note on the model results, the 
concession holder in this model is already exhibiting a 
constrained behavior by planning roads based only on 
locations of LT. To the extent that concession holders, in 
practice, build roads to access IT directly (and thus are less 
constrained as a baseline than in this model), we would expect 
the shift in road building under effective monitoring to be even 
more significant. 
The effect of denser and more branched roads on the land 
cover is greater forest fragmentation, which has been shown 
to have substantial adverse ecological consequences as shifts 
in light, moisture, and access allow some flora and fauna 
species to flourish at the expense of others (Laurance and 
Bierregaard, 1997; Perfecto et al., 2009; Tscharntke et al., 2007). 
Edge habitats become dominant and pest invasions increase 
with associated changes in community structure (Wilkie et al., 
2000). Perhaps more important are the indirect effects on the 
forest brought by increased access via the roads – hunting and 
poaching of large game are particularly salient examples in the 
Congo Basin context. Wilkie et al. (1992) speculated that it was 
the facilitation of hunting via roads rather than tree felling 
that was the greater threat; Wilkie et al. (2000) found that 
access to roads had cut the average hunting trip in the Congo 
from 12 h to less than two. Roads also provide access for small-
scale illegal logging ventures (Brown and Ekoko, 2001), whose 
practices may be more destructive and less efficient than 
those of the concession holder. Finally, though deforestation 
in the region is fairly low at present, demand for agricultural 
land is expected to increase in future, and the access provided 
by roads makes the resulting fragmentation a good predictor 
of future deforestation (Zhang et al., 2006). 
A second key result is the set of qualitative differences 
demonstrated between the responses to spot and checkpoint 
monitoring approaches. In the spot monitoring case, the 
potential risk to the concessionaire of being caught for 
harvesting IT is the same at all points in the grid, at all times 
during the sanction period. In the checkpoint monitoring case, 
the risk of being caught (and the potential loss to the 
concessionaire) depends on what has already been cut in 
that time period. In the spot monitoring case it is always or 
never worthwhile for the concessionaire to cut IT, with a sharp 
threshold marking the shift between the two regimes. In        
          
      
           
         
          
        
        
        
         
       
      
       
        
        
          
    
      
      
         
       
       
         
         
       
       
       
       
        
         
       
       
         
       
       
      
          
       
         
        
        
          
        
        
        
      
        
          
         
           
          
    
     
       
         
       
       
         
        
contrast, in the checkpoint monitoring case it remains 
worthwhile (at least sometimes) to cut IT under a range of 
levels of monitoring effectiveness. The investment perspec-
tive for the two approaches may be then to invest in spot 
monitoring if there are sufficient resources to make it effective 
and the benefits justify the costs, and otherwise to invest in 
checkpoint monitoring (where there will be some level of 
response to even low levels of monitoring). Our analysis 
examines the two approaches over a comparable range of 
achieved forest outcomes, but does not examine the costs of 
achieving them. The ability to compare the cost-effectiveness 
of achieving particular forest outcomes through different 
monitoring approaches has management as well as research 
value, and should be a target for future research. 
The insights discussed above are of particular relevance to 
forest governance in a REDD+ (or REDD++) world. REDD+ is a 
performance-based mechanism through which developed-
country donors can compensate developing countries for 
forest emissions reductions, including through market mech-
anisms (Phelps et al., 2010). To ensure that REDD+ programs 
and projects actually result in emissions reduction, an 
improved and globally acceptable system of low-cost moni-
toring and enforcement is crucial. Popularly referred to as MRV 
– monitoring, reporting, and verification – the goal of improved 
enforcement is to ensure that countries and agencies 
participating in REDD+ projects monitor these projects (either 
themselves or through reliable third parties), provide an 
estimate of the amount of additional carbon sequestered 
through their projects, and allow verification of their esti-
mates by credible third parties. In essence, the effectiveness of 
REDD+ depends upon how much more effectively and 
efficiently REDD+ projects are monitored compared to past 
monitoring. 
Our modeling analysis raises a set of questions that are 
empirically testable through field study and remote sensing 
analysis, and the current interest surrounding REDD+ and 
related experimentation into effective approaches at gover-
nance (e.g., Austin et al., 2010) may provide an ideal testing 
ground for longitudinal studies of forest management. First 
and most generally, are there detectable shifts in patterns of 
road building in response to shifts in monitoring effective-
ness? Second, are there also concomitant shifts in forest 
ecology, and can they be attributed to observed shifts in road 
building or other impacts of changes in monitoring effective-
ness? Third, how do these impacts vary across different 
approaches to monitoring? Finally, how do the costs of 
achieving forest outcomes compare across these different 
approaches? We present our analysis and the questions it 
raises as a point of departure for empirical scholars of land-
use change and concession forestry in the tropics, and invite 
the coupling of existing and new data sets to models such as 
ours in order to improve our understanding of the links among 
forest ecology and forest management. 
Although existing scholarship emphasizes the positive 
impact of effective monitoring on resource outcomes (Chhatre 
and Agrawal, 2008; Gibson et al., 2005; Ostrom, 1990), our 
research suggests that the spatial structure and specific 
elements of monitoring practices can have a substantial 
impact on how the co-benefits of REDD+ projects will be 
achieved. There is substantial variety in the types of 
      
        
         
        
        
      
         
      
  
       
      
         
       
     
      
          
        
     
  
           
     
        
       
        
  
        
     
  
       
      
        
      
     
    
       
      
      
  
          
        
       
       
      
      
          
       
       
   
        
        
   
        
      
        
monitoring and enforcement approaches being proposed for
REDD+ – our analysis suggests that some monitoring strategies
may lead to greater forest fragmentation, even as they help
reduce emissions. Our results indicate the value of modeling
these system interactions and field testing the effects of
different forest monitoring strategies to better understand
how monitoring will affect not only carbon emissions, but also
potential biodiversity and livelihoods outcomes generated by
forests.
Appendix. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2011.
11.005.
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Angoué, C., Gami, N., Ndoye, O., Ngono, G., Nguinguiri, J.C.,
Nzala, D., Toirambe, B., Yalibanda, Y., 2005. Logging in the
Congo Basin: a multi-country characterization of timber
companies. Forest Ecology and Management 214, 221–236.
Perfecto, I., Vandermeer, J., Wright, A., 2009. Nature’s Matrix.
Earthscan Press, London.
Phelps, J., Webb, E., Agrawal, A., 2010. Does REDD+ threaten to
recentralize forest governance? Science 328, 312–313.
Schlueter, M., Leslie, H., Levin, S., 2009. Managing water-use
trade-offs in a semi-arid river delta to sustain multiple
ecosystem services: a modeling approach. Ecological
Research 24, 491–503.
Soares-Filho, B.S., Nepstad, D.C., Curran, L.M., Cerqueira, G.C.,
Garcia, R.A., Ramos, C.A., Voll, E., McDonald, A., Lefebvre, P.,
Schlesinger, P., 2006. Modelling conservation in the Amazon
basin. Nature 440, 520–523.
       
      
        
         
    
       
      
      
      
 
         
       
Stickler, C.M., Nepstad, D.C., Coe, M.T., McGrath, D.G.,
Rodrigues, H.O., Walker, W., Soares-Filho, B.S., Davidson,
E.A., 2009. The potential ecological costs and cobenefits of
REDD: a critical review and case study from the Amazon
Region. Global Change Biology 2803–2824.
Summers, P.M., Browder, J.O., Pedlowski, M.A., 2004. Tropical
forest management and silvicultural practices by small
farmers in the Brazilian Amazon: recent farm-level
evidence from Rondonia. Forest Ecology and Management
192, 161–177.
Tscharntke, T., Leuschner, C., Zeller, M., Guhardja, E., Bidin, A.,
2007. The Stability of Tropical Rainforest Margins, Linking        
   
          
       
   
       
        
   
           
       
        
    
Ecological, Economic and Social Constraints of Land Use and
Conservation. Springer Verlag, Berlin.
Wilkie, D., Shaw, E., Rotberg, F., Morelli, G., Auzel, P., 2000.
Roads, development, and conservation in the Congo Basin.
Conservation Biology 14, 1614–1622.
Wilkie, D., Sidle, J.G., Boundzanga, G.C., 1992. Mechanized
logging, market hunting, and a bank loan in Congo.
Conservation Biology 6, 570–580.
Zhang, Q., Justice, C.O., Jiang, M., Brunner, J., Wilkie, D., 2006. A
GIS-based assessment on the vulnerability and future extent
of the tropical forests of the Congo Basin. Environmental
Monitoring and Assessment 2006, 107–121.
